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LIFE ON A FEDERAL ISLAND IN THE CIVILIAN SEA 
Wil liam E. Crawford* 
The Louisiana lawyer practicing both in state court and in the federal system is 
subject to legal schizophrenia as a normal way of life.1 The first reason for this 
schizophrenia is that under civilian doctrine the basic private law of Louisiana is 
limited to the law declared in the Civil Code and other legislation. 2 Its interpreta­
tion by the Louisiana judiciary, no matter how often repeated, uniform, o r  con­
sistent, does not constitute law under the faithfully-held doctrine of jurisprudence 
constante as specifically pronounced by the Louisiana Supreme Court, 3 in keeping 
with the long-standing tradition of the civilian notion of law as opposed to inter­
pretation of the law by the judiciary. 
In Louisiana there is no rule of stare decisis; instead its counterpart of jurispru­
dence constante prevails. Thus, a federal court sitting in a diversity case, in which 
it must apply Louisiana substantive law under the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 
rule,4 must apply the appropriate Louisiana legislation, as distinguished from in­
terpretations of the legislation pronounced in cases dealing with it; therefore, it is 
not bound to apply interpretations of that legislation found in Louisiana decisions, 
for those decisions do not bind the Louisiana judiciary itself in later cases. 5 Never­
theless, while the federal court is not bound by the jurisprudence, it would be un­
reasonable for the federal bench to ignore the interpretations found in Louisiana 
decisions unless they are manifestly inappropriate, for the very purpose o f  Erie is 
to instruct the federal judiciary in a diversity case to apply the applicable state law 
in the manner in which it would be applied in the state courts.6 Determining the 
governing Louisiana interpretation pronounced through the judiciary can thus be 
uncertain. 
Ascertaining the correct rule of law can be difficult for the additional reason 
that the Louisiana appellate judiciary in 1992 rendered from the courts of appeals 
a total of 3533 opinions,7 and from the supreme court, 178,8 contrasted with 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi which in 1992 rendered only 386 dispositions 
* James J. Bailey Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. The research and analysis of John 
Felder Crawford, II, research assistant for this Article, was indispensable, particularly on the matters of jurispru­
dence constante and the federal treatment of Louisiana products liability cases. 
1. The late Judge Alvin B. Rubin visited this area in his article, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in a Federal 
Court: Travel and Tmvail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. REv. l 369 ( 1988). 
2. LA. C!v. CooEANN. art . I (West 1993). 
3. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, l 334 (La. 1978). 
4. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637 (1938). 
5. Clarkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co., A Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 615 F. 
Supp. 775, 778 (M.D. La. 1985). 
6. Erie, 304 U.S. at72-73. 
7. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 26 (1992). There were 
251 I civil and I022 criminal opinions from the courts of appeals in 1992. Id. 
8. Id. at 23. There were 131 civil opinions from the supreme court and 47 criminal opinions. Id. 
1 
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by signed opinion. 9 This proliferation of jurisprud
ence tends to diffuse any sharp 
and precise statements oflaw. . . . . 
Another source of schizophrenia-inducing difference m the
 two systems lies m 
the procedural area. Louisiana has a fact-pleading system 
of procedure, �s ��­
posed to the notice pleading procedure of the federal system. Ev�
n
. 
more s1gn1f1-
cant is the Louisiana system of appellate review of fact. The Lou1s1ana
 appellate 
judiciary has the constitutional authority to reverse the findings of a jury on
 the 
facts and to render a contrary judgment on the spot, from the appellate bench. 
10 A 
Louisiana appellate court thus has the authority to review the transcript on appeal 
from a case in which the jury found that the defendant was not negligent; deter­
mine that the jury was clearly w rong in its finding; enter its own finding that negli­
gence did occur; if there is evidence in the trial record to support it, make a finding 
of the damages and quantum to which the plaintiff is entitled; and then render 
judgment accordingly against the defendant from the appellate bench, without re­
mand and without a further right of appeal. 
This procedure is possible only because there is no constitutional right to a civil 
jury trial in Louisiana. 11 The Seventh Amendment guarantees a civil jury trial un­
der the United States Constitution in the federal system, ensuring that a defendant 
winning his case before a jury in federal court-if the jury charges contained no 
error and if sufficient evidence supported the jury verdict- can feel comfortable 
that the case is over as to factual issues. T his same federal guarantee of a civil jury 
trial controls summary judgment practice and dispositions by federal judges on 
motions for directed verdicts, motions for JNOV, rulings on questions of evidence 
before the jury, and any other handling of findings or rulings o n  factual issues, for 
factual issues must be left to the jury, not determined by the court. 12 
In this same vein, the traditional proximate cause issue in Louisiana is known 
a
_
sthe duty/risk analysis. Under the leading Louisiana case, this analysis is a ques­
tion fo� the cou�, not .the jury. 
13 If a federal judge were to determine a proximate 
cause issue by mvokmg the duty/risk analysis, he would violate the parties' 
Seventh Amen�m�nt righ� . Thus, the lawyer in Louisiana's state court system 
must prepare his tnal and his appellate argument in terms of duty /risk, while in the 
federal system he must follow the traditional proximate cause analysis found in the 
other states. 
9. ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI 27 (1992) 10. LA. CONST. of 1 974
. art. v, § 5(C). 
· 
11. Melancon v. McKeithen 345 F Su 1025 1045 (E ll.S. l!l'JX(l973). ' . p
p. 
' .D. La.),affd,409 U.S. 943(1972),anda.ff'd,409 
12. S1·c. '"�·. Frn. R. eiv. P. 50 . 
. 
1 J. "Regardless if stated in terms of proximate cause I l ultunatcly a question of policy as to whether the 
. l ega cause, o.r �uty, the scope of the duty inquiry is 
llcnoit. ti05 So. 2u 1032, 1044 (La. 1991 ). 
part1cu ar nsk falls w1thm the scope of the duty." Roberts v. 
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I. DETERMINING THE Erie RULE OF LAW IN LOUISIANA 
The most recent Erie mandate on a federal court is that it should seek the cor­
rect statement of law in the same fashion that the highest court of the state (in 
which the federal court sits) would search, evaluate, and pronounce it. 14 The Erie 
mandate may then subdivide into two significantly different intellectual endeav­
ors: the Erie evaluation; 15 and, on the other hand, the Erie guess.16 
A. The Erie Evaluation 
The Erie mandate as followed in common law states by the federal courts is cor­
rectly summed up by the following statement: "A federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction and called upon in that role to apply state law is absolutely bound by a 
current interpretation of that law formulated by the state's highest tribunal. "17 
Clarkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas Eastern Gas Pipeline Co., A Div ision of Texas 
Eastern Transmission Corp. 18 is an excellent illustration of the Erie evaluation 
process by a federal judge sitting in Louisiana. The issue before the district court 
was whether to apply a contractual stipulation of a choice of law provision, or to 
decline to apply the stipulation on the ground that to do so would contravene a 
strong public policy rule of Louisiana. 19 Following the Erie mandate, the court at­
tempted to determine whether Louisiana had departed from the lex loci delicti rule 
in tort cases. 20 After a d etailed consideration of the relevant cases and jurispru­
dence, the court referred to the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court in the 
leading case, Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co. ;21 but it then followed the observation 
of the Fifth Circuit, that "Jagers is far from clear, "22 and concluded that one could 
not rely on Jagers to say that Louisiana had departed from the lex loci delicti rule­
that Louisiana had firmly adopted the interest analysis considered in Jagers. 23 
At this point, the judge, referring to jurisp rudenc e constante, observed that 
Louisiana civilian tradition did not require him to find Jagers controlling: "[I]n a 
civilian jurisdiction such as Louisiana, it is risky business to rely overly much 
upon extensions of judicial decisions as stating the applicable law, particularly 
where, as here, Article 10 of the Civil Code provides a statutory basis for the 
law . ... "24 
14. CHARLFS A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTS § 58, at 373 (41h ed. 1983). 
15. Clarkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co., A Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 615 F. 
Supp. 775, 776 (M.D. La. 1985). 
16. Thom pson v. Johns-M anville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581, 582 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
110 2 (1984). 
17. Daigle v. Maine Medical Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 689 (1st Cir. 1994). 
18.615F.Supp. 775(M.D. La. 1985). 
19. Id. at 776. 
2 0 .  Id. at 777. Lex loci delicti refers to the "place of the wrong." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (6th ed. 1990). 
21. 276So. 2d309(La. 1973). 
22. Lee v. Hunt. 631F.2d1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980 ), cerr. denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981). 
23. Clarkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co . . A Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp . . 615 F. 
Supp. 775, 777 (M.D. La. 1985). 
24. Id. at 778 (footnote omitted). 
4 
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Footnote two of the Clarkco opinion articulates so fully and with such great rel­
evance the entire Erie evaluation process under jurisprudence constante that it is 
set forth herein in full. 25 Whether an Erie search under the rule of stare decisis26 
would yield a different-sounding discussion is beyond the shore of this civilian 
sea. 
The essence of the theory of jurisprudence constante, as recognized by the judge 
in C/arkco, is that judicial precedent is established by a judge on the basis of gen­
eral rules of law provided by legislators for the decision of those disputes, and is 
not based on the general rules of law extracted from judicial precedent.27 The ac­
cumulated precedents gain significance because the words of the legislation, as 
consistently spoken by judges in their decisions, are attributed to the legislator, 
and·the meaning of the rule of law enacted by the legislator is taken from the spe­
cific meaning given to it by judges. 28 Further, the judge analyzes those judicial de­
cisions to determine whether or not they comprise a general rule of law consistent 
with the needs of the pending case. 29 If what he finds does not fit the needs of the 
case, then he may disregard the law as spoken by the judges and "return to the 
words of the general rule of law spoken by the legislator, under the theory that 
judges are bound to apply the law as given to them by the legislature and not as 
paraphrased by other judges."30 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, explaining the doctrine, said in part: 
In Louisiana, courts are not bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, but there is a rec­
ognition in this State of the doctrine of jurisprudence constante. Unlike stare decisis, 
this latter doctrine does not contemplate adherence to a principle of law announced 
and applied on a single occasion in the past. 
However, when, by repeated decisions in a long line of cases, a rule of law has 
been accepted and applied by the courts, these adjudications assume the dignity of 
25. Footnote two states: 
For. example, Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury lns[urance] Co., while distaining [sic] the doctrine of stare decis'.s 
.
did recogmze the doctrine ?f jurisprudence constante. After citing a long l ine of Louisiana cases 
stretching over a seventy year period applying the lex loci delicti doctrine as the "established rule "the 
court noted: ''Fundamental and elementary principles recognize that certainty and constancy of th� law 
arc indispensable to or�erly social intercourse, a sound economic climate and a stable government." 
R
llolmsmi,123? So.2d [sic) at 218. Exactly three years later Johnson was expressly overruled byJawrs � 
oyal /11d<'m111ty Co. 
o· · 
Louisiana iooks first to stmutory law . . . . "In deciding the issue before us the lower courts did not �oll�w
·
t�� process of referrmg first to the code and other legislative sources but treated language from 
�.JU. '.c
.
1� opimon as the primary source of law. This is an indication that the position of the decided �as
.
c as an 11\ustratmn of past expene.nce.and the theory of the individualization of decision have not ccn proper
.
y understood by our JUnsts m many instances." 
IArdmn v .
. 
Hart fordAcc1dent&lndem.Co.,]3 60So.2d[sic][l3311 33 · · 
no lcg1slat1ve conflict of laws rule in tort cases. It ma b . 
' I 4.[(�. 1978)]. Lou1s1ana has 
<Second) Connicts of Laws ( 1969) has not bee d 
Y e important to .b�ar m mmd that the Restatement 
. 
Civil Code: Article 1 o is a part of the Code. 
n a opted by the Louisiana Legislature as a part of the 
Ua�kc1: Cmumctors. 615 F. Supp. at 778 n.2 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) 
�6. To abide by. or adhere to. decided cases." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 C6th ed. 1990) 
-1. Juuo C. CUETO-RUA, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW 70 (1981) 
. 
28. /ti. at 74. 
· 
29. lei. at 76. 
JO. Id. at 77. 
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jurisprudence constante; and the rule oflaw upon which they are based is entitled to 
great weight in subsequent decisions. 31 
It is thus submitted that the federal judges sitting in Louisiana are not bound by 
the recent pronouncements in Gauthier v. O'Brien32 and Touchard v. Williams, 33 
each of which is a single Louisiana Supreme Court pronouncement as to the mean­
ing or interpretation of Article 2324 of the Civil Code, which regulates solidary 
liability among joint tortfeasors.34 On the face of those opinions, compared to the 
legislators' words they interpret, there is room to differ seriously with whether the 
c ases are correct interpretations of the law. According to all of the foregoing ex­
position of the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, a federal judge sitting in 
Louisiana under the mandate of Erie, with the corollary doctrine of jurisprudence 
constante, is not bound to follow those decisions. The keystone of this proposition 
is that the Erie mandate directs a federal judge to incorporate the d octrine of 
jurisprudence constante into his divining of the Louisiana substantive law applica­
ble to the case before him, 35 an evaluation process that must go beyond the most 
recent Louisiana Supreme Court opinion. 
B. The Erie Guess 
In Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 36 the court in a diversity case had 
the following issue: "This Louisiana diversity appeal requires us to determine 
whether the law of that state would dispense with proof of causation against some 
o f  [the] multiple defendants in an asbestosis  case."37 The court found that 
Louisiana had not adopted such a dispensation of proof in any reported case, that 
the theories advanced b y  the plaintiff represented radical departures from tradi­
tional theories of tort liability, and that the only support for the plaintiffs claim as 
to Louisiana law was a supposed tendency of Louisiana courts to expand the liabil­
ity of manufacturers , which the court found insufficient to make such an expansion 
of Louisiana doctrine. 38 The court therefore d eclined to adopt the theory as the 
law of Louisiana. 39 
The dissent criticized the majority for making an "Erie guess," saying that the 
majority was predicting what the Louisiana courts would do, and that such a case 
of first impression should be determined by a certification of the question to the 
Louisiana Supreme Court. 40 
31. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 236So. 2d 216, 218 (La. 1 970), overruled by lagers v. Royal ln-
dem. Co . . 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973). 
32. 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993) (interpreting revised Article 2324 of the Civil Code). 
33. 617 So. 2d 885 (La. 1993) (interp reting revised Article 2324 of the Civil Code). 
34. LA. Civ. CoDEANN. art. 2324(West 1979&Supp. 1994). 
35. C larkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co. , A Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 615 F. 
Supp. 775, 778 (M.D. La. 1985). 
36. 714 F.2d581 (5th Cir. 1983), cerr. denied,465 U.S. 1102 (1984). 
37. Thompson, 714 F.2d at 581. 
38. Id. at 583. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
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In discussions of the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, frequent reference is 
made to the fact that legislation (which includes the Civil Code and other statutes) 
is the primary source of law. There should be no h�at�s, no quest
.
ion on �hich the 
law does not speak, because of Article 4 of the Civil Code, which provides that 
when there is no applicable rule in the legislation, the court must proceed accord­
ing to equity- resorting to 'justice, reason, and prevailing usages. "41 
If the theory and doctrine of judicial application of law operates as the 
Louisiana Supreme Court has stated and as commentators have frequently writ­
ten, it is submitted that the majority in Thompson was completely correct in decid­
ing the case on its own legal analysis because it was simply obeying the mandate of 
Erie and the civilian process in Louisiana, particularly in view o f  the positive di­
rective in Article 4 of the Civil Code. Thus, if there are no cases, then the court 
must itself go to the legislative source, and if there is no legislative source specifi­
cally applicable, then the Civil Code commands that the court resort to "equity. "42 
Can it be said that there is no applicable rule of Louisiana law on a question simply 
because there is no appellate court opinion pronouncing a rule? The Civil Code is 
a positive statement to the contrary. A federal judge sitting in Louisiana should 
never consider himself to be making a guess, for he is only applying the law as the 
civilian system commands the judge to do. He is likewise, as a federal judge, com­
manded to follow the state civilian theory, which, it is submitted, is inherent in the 
mandate of Erie as applied to Louisiana. 
C. Current Practice with Certification of Questions 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13: 72 .1 provides that the  Supreme Court 
or the circuit courts of appeals of the United States may certify questions to the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, "which certificate the supreme court of this state may, 
by written opinion, answer. "43 Rule XII of the Louisiana Supreme Court Rules im­
plements the foregoing statutory provision, but adds an interesting sentence: "This 
court may, in its discretion, decline to answer the questions c ertified to it ."44 
The certification of questions has been used heavily in Louisiana. Electronic 
r�search s�ows that from.�pril 19, 1963, through July 22, 1994, a total of eighty­
nme questions were cert1f1ed from federal court.45 The questions ranged across 
the spectrum of legal issues.45 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit has certified to the 
Mississippi Suprem� Cou� from Nov�mber 30, 1964, through October 19, 1992, 
only
. 
f?rty-one questions. A substantial number of major pronouncements by the 
Lou1s1ana Supreme Court-fundamental to different areas of the law, though with 
41. "When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from le i 1 · · prn.:ccd accord mg to equity. To decide equitabl reso . . 
g
. 
s atton or custom, the court 1s bound to 
Civ. ConF. ANN. art. 4 (West 1993). 
y, rt is made to1us11ce, reason, and prevailing usages." LA. 
42. fd. 
4J. LA. Rl'v. STAT. ANN. § 13:72.1(West 1983). 
44. LA. Sur. Cr. R. XII. 
45. S.:arch ofWESTLAW, CTA5 database (July 26, 1994). 
46. /d. 
47. /c/. 
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a heavy concentration in the torts area48 - have been in response to the certified 
question procedure. 
It is difficult to find a sharp distinction among the cases that the Fifth Circuit 
chooses to answer for itself, such as Thompson, 49 as opposed to those in which it 
certifies the question, such as Halphen v. Johns-Manv ille Sales Corp.50 Two very 
significant Fifth Circuit opinions, both authored by the late Judge Alvin Rubin, 
ruled on the retroactivity vel non of the Louisiana Products Liability Act, without 
certifying that question. 51 It is an interesting comparison of judicial techniques to 
see the exhaustive analysis and research devoted to the questions by Judge Rubin, 
a s  opposed to the terse decree of nonretroactivity by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court. 52 The principles underlying the doctrine of jurisprudence constante might 
well say that it is the federal rule on that question that should be followed, rather 
than the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion. 
The high court of Maryland responded to a certified question from a federal dis­
trict court in that state. 53 The federal court found the opinion to be unusable, so 
that it decided the case using its own legal analysis. 54 
II. APPELLATE REVIEW OF FACT VS. 
SEVENTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEE OF JURY TRIAL 
Louisiana's constitutional grant of jurisdiction over the facts as well a s  the law55 
is perhaps a more profound difference between practice in state court and practice 
in federal court than is the difference between civil law and common law. As fore­
shadowed in the introductory paragraphs of this Article, the Louisiana appellate 
judiciary has the authority not only to reverse the finding of a jury on the facts, but 
to pronounce a final judgment from the appellate bench, without remand. 56 A de­
fendant thus cast in judgment has no effective right of appeal. He does have the 
right to apply for writs from the Louisiana Supreme Court, but of the 1477 
applications filed in civil cases in 1993, only 245 were granted.57 Jurisdiction of 
the facts (and the corollary power to determine them) is not a theoretical or aca­
demic power in the hands of the Louisiana appellate judiciary. As of July 1994, 
48. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 52 1 So. 2d 1 1 23 (La. 1 988); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 
So. 2d 110 (La. 1986); Bell v. Jee W heel Blast, Div. ofErvin Indus., 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985); Olsen v. Shell 
Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978). 
49. T hompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (Sch Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1 102 
(1984). 
50. 484 So. 2d l lO(La. 1 986). 
51. Miles v. Olin Corp., 922 F.2d 122 1 (5th Cir. 1991); Lav esp ere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 9 1 0  
F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990}, cert. denied, 114 S .  Ct. 171 (1993). 
52. Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1 991). 
53. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1 985). See also Delahanty v. Hinckley, 845 F.2d 1069, 
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Indeed, Kelley's theoretical underpinnings are somewhat unclear."). 
54. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1161-62. 
55. "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases 
extends to both law and facts." LA. CONST. of 1 974, art. V, § 5(C). The provision for the Louisiana courts of 
appeals is essentially the same. Id. § IO(B). 
56. Wright v. f'dramount-Richards T h eatres, Inc., 198 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1952). 
57. ANNUAL REPORT Of THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF LoUISIANA 23 ( 1993). 
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electronic research showed that among the courts of appeals and the supreme 
court since 1983, jury verdicts were reversed on the facts in approximately 173 
cases. 58 The jury was reversed on quantum in approximate I y 1 16 cases. 59 This is 
not to say that in all those cases final judgments contrary to the jury verdict were 
rendered on the spot from the appellate bench. 
The federal courts have long been aware of this difference in jurisdiction over 
facts: 
As to the sufficiency of the evidence on the issues of negligence and contributory 
negligence, we are governed by the standard developed in Boeing Co. v. Shipman. 
Louisiana appellate courts, on the other hand, have the right and the duty to review 
both the law and the facts in civil cases. "As a consequence of that situation, in ci vii 
cases federal courts evaluating decisions of Louisiana state courts as precedents 
have the difficult task of separating the decisions of the Louisiana courts on the law 
from their review of the facts .• .so 
The practice in the courts of Louisiana was set forth in Wright v. Paramount­
Richards Theatres, Inc. :61 
In the state of Louisiana, the principles of the common law are not recog­
nized; neither do the principles of the civil law of Rome furnish the basis of 
their jurisprudence. They have a system peculiar to themselves, adopted by 
their statutes, which embodies much of the civil law, some of the principles of 
the common law, and, in a few instances, the statutory provisions of other 
states. This system may be called the civil law of Louisiana, and is peculiar to 
that state. 
Continuing to describe the Louisiana practice, Mr. Justice McLean said[:] "The 
facts found by the jury are examined by the appellate court, and its judgment is given 
on the facts, without the intervention of a jury." 
In Louisiana state courts, the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Seventh 
Amendment of the United States Constitution does not exist. The Louisiana Code of 
Practice of 1870 provides for jury trials in certain civil cases; but  app ellate courts 
have the right and duty to review both the law and the facts in all civil cases . 
. 
Federal �ourts are forbidden by the Seventh Amendment to re-examine any fact 
tried by a Jury otherwise than according to the rules of the common law while 
�ouis �ana �tate 
.
c�u�s can review the facts in all civil cases. As a consequenc� of that 
s1tuat1on, m c1v1I Jury cases federal courts evaluating decisions of Louisiana 
state
. 
�ourts as precedents have the difficult task of separating the decisions of the 
Louisiana courts on the law from their review of facts.62 
58. Electronic data (on file with the Mississippi College Law Review). 
59. Electronic data (on file with the Mississippi College Law Review). 
60. M1skdl v. Southern Food Co . . 439 F 2d 790 792 (5 h · · · · 
I quoting Wright. 198 F.2d at 306). 
· 
' 1 Cir. 1971) (c1tat1ons omitted) (emphasis added) 
hi. 198 F2d 303 (5th Cir. 1952). 
h�. Id. at �06 I quoting Parsons v. Bedford
, 28 U.S. (3 Pet . ) 433, 450, 451 (1830)). 
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A recent case illustrating the exercise of this authority is Hines v. Remington 
Arms Co. 63 The plaintiff was severely injured when his rifle accidentally fired into 
a gun powder canister. 64 The rifle was used purely for competition shooting and 
had a very sensitive trigger which allegedly discharged when the bullet was cham­
bered, without any deliberate pulling of the trigger itself. 65 The facts were that the 
plaintiff fired the rifle with the muzzle six to eight i nches from the cardboard can­
ister of powder. 66 The claim against Remington was dismissed at an early stage, 67 
and the case proceeded against the manufacturer of the powder and against the 
maker of the rifle. 68 The jury found both defendants not liable because neither the 
rifle nor the gun powder was defective. 69 The court of appeals reversed the jury 
verdict and found the maker of the rifle liable under the per se liability theory for 
an unreasonably dangerous product, 70 and found the powder manufacturer liable 
for failure to warn as to safe storage of the gun powder. 71 The court of appeals 
awarded a judgment of $2, 000, 000 in general damages to the victim himself and 
then awarded $50,000 to his wife for her loss of consortium.72 Attorney's fees 
were awarded under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2545 in the amount of t wenty­
five percent of the total judgment against the maker of the rifle. 73 All told, the 
judgment awarded was i n  the sum of $2,458, 128.92, not including the consor­
tium award of $50,000. 74 At the same time, the court fixed the allocation of fault 
at thirty-four percent to the plaintiff, and thirty-three percent to each of the defend­
ants. 75 This was all determined from the appellate bench, without remand; 76 there 
was no effective appeal from this judgment. 
A second example of Louisiana courts' authority over factual issues is set out in 
Weatherford v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. 77 A priest was driving his car and 
saw the eight-year-old victim riding in the same direction on his new bicycle. 78 As 
Father Termini rounded a curve, the victim suddenly turned his bicycle to the 
right, directly into the path of Termini's vehicle. 79 The jury found he was not  negli­
gent. 00 The court of appeals reviewed the record and stated: 
63. 630 So. 2d 809 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
64. Id. at 812. 
65. Id. at 8 13. 
66. Id. at 8 12. 
67. Id. at 813. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 812. 
70. Id. at 8 14. 
7 I . Id. at 817. 
72. Id. 
73. /d. at 819. 
74. Id. at817. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 820. 
77. 637 So. 2d 1208 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
78. Id. at 1209. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 1210. 
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However under the facts and circumstances here presented, we are convinced that 
the jury :nanifestly erred in its determination. Conside�ing the high degre� of care 
that is required of a motoris t when he sees a young child on the road, neither the 
jurisprudence nor the evidence supports the jury's determination that Father 
Termini was not negligent in the manner in which he operated his vehicle shortly 
prior to and at the time of the accident. 81 
A third example is Beckham v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 82 This case 
was tried to the court without a jury. 83 The judge found the defendant surgeon not 
liable, concluding that he had not committed medical malpractice. 84 The court of 
appeals reversed the judgment, found the defendant negligent, 85 and from the ap­
pellate bench awarded a judgment of $144,221.17 with interest and costs. 86 
It is typical in these cases that the reversal of the jury verdict is not based upon 
an error in the charge to the jury. In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court has ad­
monished the courts of appeals that, if in reviewing a record the court discovers an 
error in the charge, they are to formulate a correct charge for themselves, read the 
transcript, and render judgment accordingly, without remand, taking cognizance 
of the correct statement of law. 87 The s ignificance of a clear statement of the law is 
thus much diminished in the Louisiana system of appellate review of fact. 88 
On the other hand, an accurate statement of the law is sacramental if the case is 
being tried in a federal court under the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury 
trial. If on review by the federal court of appeals a substantial error was found in 
the jury charge, the verdict, whether for the plaintiff or for the defendant, would 
be set aside and the case remanded for trial under the correct c harge. 89 Electronic 
research has shown that this reversal of jury verdicts is virtually nonexistent in the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In the last compilation of figures, over a period of 
seventy-five years, until 1987 when the review was last accomplished, only thir­
teen cases had been reversed on the facts.9° Contrary to the Louisiana system, in 
none of t?ose cases could the federal circuit court of appeals render a final judg­
ment agamst a defendant from the appellate bench. 
A. Duty/Risk vs. Proximate Cause 
Th
.
e judicially-adopted and certified mode of analysis for actions ex delicto is 
d�scnbed �s the duty/risk analysis. The significant difference between the duty/ 
nsk analysis and the traditional proximate cause analysis (as set forth by Justice 
81. Id. 
82. 614 So. 2d 760 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
8.\. Id. at 763. 
84. Id. 
85. /d. at 767. 
86. Id. at 772. 
87. S<·e Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So. 2d 163, 165 (La. 1975). 88. Parsons v. Bedford. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 443 (1830). 
89. WRIGllT . .  mpm note 14, § 94, at 630. 
90. William E. Crawford Should Louisiana R t · c ·1 (1987). 
• eam iv1 Appellate Review of Facts?, 35 LA. B.J. 245, 250 
1994) LIFE ON A FEDERAL ISIAND IN THE CIVILIAN SEA 1 1  
Andrews in his dissent to Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. 91) is that, under the 
duty I risk analysis, the issue of whether the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable to 
the defendant is treated as a question of policy or law, rather than one of fact. The 
question is asked whether the risk of the injury that occurred fell within the ambit 
of the duty incumbent upon the defendant. The leading case on this point holds that 
the decision is one of policy. 92 The case does not go so far as to say that it is a ques­
tion of law, but it is well-recognized that questions of policy are for the court, 
while questions of fact are for.the jury. Thus, in federal court under the civil jury 
trial guarantee, a proximate cause issue in the traditional sense must be accorded 
to the jury because what constitutes a question of fact under the Seventh Amend­
ment is determined through historic standards -i.e. , the questions of fact de­
scribed in the Seventh Amendment are those so classified at the time the 
Amendment was adopted in 1791. 93 The earliest torts treatises all classify the 
proximate cause issue as a question of fact for the jury. It could therefore make a 
significant difference in the outcome of a case involving a substantial proximate 
cause question as to whether the parties found themselves in federal court or in 
state court, in the hands o f  the jury or in the hands of the judge. 
B. Precedential Value of Appellate Fact Finding 
Particularly in the area of products liability, Louisiana appellate courts have 
found products to be defective upon reviewing all of the evidence. For Erie pur­
poses, is this a rule of substantive law as to a given product, or is it a finding of 
fact, as a matter of law? S everal opinions can be construed to be a pronouncement 
of substantive law. There are several escalator cases in Louisiana in which children 
injured their feet by having them caught between the moving stairs and the side­
wall of the escalator. The leading case stated: "The inescapable conclusion is that 
escalators, for all their utility, are unreasonably dangerous to small children ... . 
Although not unreasonably dangerous 'per se', escalators are unreasonably dan­
gerous to small children, making their manufacturers and custodians strictly liable 
for escalator injuries to those children.''94 
The obvious implication brought forth an application for rehearing which was 
denied per curiam: 
91. 162N.E.99(N.Y.1928). 
92. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d !032, 1044 (La. 1991). See also the full analysis of the problem by David 
W. Robertson, The Precedent Value of Conclusions of Fact in Civil Cases in England and Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 
78, 93 (1968). 
93. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 92, at 609. 
94. Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 514 So. 2d439, 444 (La. 1987). 
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It is not our intention to hold that a l l  escalators are unreasonably dangerous to small 
children. We merely found that the escalator in this case was unreas�nably d�nger­
ous because of a failure to provide an adequate warning of a d anger mherent m the 
use of the escalator which was not within the knowledge of or obv ious to the ordi­
nary user. This is an independent finding by this court and not an affirmance of the 
trial court's directed verdict which was flawed by an error of law. 95 
A similar situation, found in Antley v. YamaluiMotor Corp., U. S.A. 96 and Laing 
v. American Honda Motor Co. ,97 involved three-wheeler all terrain vehicles, in 
which those vehicles were found as a matter of law to be unreasonably dangerous 
per se under Louisiana products liability law. 
While the problem has not been confronted in a case, the question is raised 
whether the Louisiana Court of Appeals has declared as a s ubstantive matter that 
escalators are unreasonably dangerous for small children (but for the rehearing per 
curiam); and has it been declared as a matter of substantive law that all three­
wheeler all terrain vehicles are actionably defective under products liability law? If 
that is the effect of the holding, how would it affect the Erie r ule in a diversity case 
in federal court involving one of those products? It follows that one would have to 
prove only that the accident was caused by a three-wheeler. The question of defec­
tiveness would have been predetermined by the Louisiana appellate opinion al­
ready so holding as a matter of substantive law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Erie mandate to the federal courts sitting in Louisiana in diversity cases 
includes the civilian doctrine of jurisprudence constante. The federal judge is n ot 
bound by the last statement of the law pronounced by the appellate courts of 
Louisiana, because the doctrine of stare decisis is not found in Louisiana. In the 
absence of jurisprudence on a question, under the Louisiana s ubstantive law found 
in the Civil Code, the federal court i s  free to go to L ouisiana legislation and any 
other sources of law to answer the question before it as though it were a Louisiana 
court; thus, certification seems unnecessary . 
. 
In the. federal �ourts sitting in Louisiana, the Seventh Amendment guarantee of 
a
. 
J �? tr�al prevatls over the L�uisia�a appellate review of fact when questions of 
fact. are mvo�ved. Whether an issue is a question of fact is for the federal court to 
�crnle, and 1� not governed by the practice of the Louisiana appellate judiciary to 
answer questions of fact as matters of law. 
:1�. llmw.n v. Scars. Roebuck & Co., 516 So. 2d 1154, 1154 (La. 1988) IO. Wl So . :!J 696 <La. Ct. App. 1989). 
. 
'17 li1K So. :!ti 1% !La. Ct. App. 1993). 
